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Introduction
Technology differences and diffusion are likely to be important factors in convergence. As recent evidence shows, cross-country differences in total factor productivity (TFP) are wide in the Summer and Heston (1991) data set, so that "changes in relative TFP levels can have important effects on the steady-state income distribution" [Jones (1997) , p. 148].
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Testing whether relative TFP levels are changing -and whether these changes generate technology convergence, as implied by the catch-up hypothesis [Abramoviz(1986) ] -is therefore of great practical importance.
In spite of this, one shortcoming of the empirical literature on growth concerns precisely the analysis of the impact of technology heterogeneity on convergence, as Bernard and Jones (1996) , among others 2 , have underlined. In particular, there are two very important lines of research convergence in which the joint role of technology heterogeneity and diffusion is neglected. The first is associated with the very influential paper by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , in which systematic cross-country parametric heterogeneity of the production function is ruled out by assumption 3 . In the following we will refer to this assumption as "hypothesis (i)" about technology and convergence.
The second line of research is associated to Islam (1995) . This paper represents a step forward on how to obtain reliable evidence on the role of technology differences in convergence using Solow's growth framework, in the absence of data on technology levels. Islam uses panel data estimates to test the hypothesis of homogeneity versus heterogeneity of the productivity shift parameter 4 , and finds evidence in favour of the latter hypothesis. In Islam's paper, however, current technological differences are treated as if they were stationary ones, so that the hypothesis that they might be a source of technological catch-up is not explicitly considered or tested. We label this approach as "hypothesis (ii)".
As a consequence, we simply do not know enough about "how much of the convergence that we observe is due to convergence in technology versus convergence in capital-labour ratios" [Bernard and Jones (1996) , p. 1043]: in the current convergence literature, this important question does not seem capable to attract the attention it deserves.
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One reason behind this insufficient attention is perhaps due 1 See also Hall and Jones (1999) . 2 On the importance of considering technology diffusion in convergence, see also Parente and Prescott (1994) , Jones (1997) , de la Fuente (1997) and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1998) . 3 More in detail, Mankiw, Romer and Weil assume that country-specific (non strictly technological) shocks exist, but they can be regarded as random disturbances independent of the explanatory variables that control for the differences in the steady-state values of per-capita income. For critical viewpoints on the role of technology in the convergence analysis of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , see also Islam (1998) and Paul Romer's comment in Snowdown and Vane (1999) . 4 See also Islam (1998) . 5 A further confirmation of this is given by a third, separate line of research, in which technology diffusion is regarded as the crucial source of convergence [for instance, Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) ]. Again, the whole observed convergence is assigned to one source (catch-up, in this case) in a context where the other (capital deepening) is neglected on a priori grounds, rather than tested.
to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish empirically between those two sources of convergence . A different and simpler approach has been recently proposed in de la Fuente (1995) and Bernard and Jones (1996) , in which a model with decreasing returns to capital is augmented with exogenous differences in the countries' ability to adopt new technology. Our model differs from de la Fuente's in two major respects. First, as in Shell (1966) 11 , the flow of new technology in each period is proportional to the amount of resources endogenously allocated to innovation. Second, the impact of any given technology gap on technology growth in a follower country is proportional to its propensity to innovate (or imitate). In this respect, our formulation is closer to the one used in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) to assess the impact of the stock of human capital on the diffusion of technology. As for Bernard and Jones (1996) , the main differences are that in our model the growth rate of the leader economy is endogenous, and that we 6 As it is well known, simple models of catch-up (in which the sources of technology accumulation are left unexplained) and the Solow model may turn out to yield predictions that are indistinguishable in cross-section and panel data [Barro and Salai-Martin (1995) Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) . 11 The growth model we use to characterise the "leader" economy is similar to the model developed in Shell's seminal paper. Islam (1995) has shown that estimating a convergence equation by means of a fixed-effect panel data estimator such as LSDV allows for testing for the presence of technology heterogeneity. In such a formulation, the individual intercepts are regarded as an indirect measure of the unobservable technology levels. 14 An implication of this problem is that, on one hand, the evidence of the type discussed in Islam (1995) should not be regarded as conclusive evidence that technology differences across economies are semi-permanent. On the other hand, hypothesis (ii) is not necessarily rejected by the existence of a positive correlation between growth rates and some index based on R&D and patents data, which may approximate the propensity to innovate. See Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniels (1997) , among many others, for examples in which this type of evidence is interpreted as corroborating the hypothesis that convergence is due to catch-up, the strength of which in turns depend on the innovative efforts of each economy. See also Fagerberg, Verspagen (1996) .
(1995)], and negative under hypothesis (iii). We conclude that in the absence of data on technology levels a carefull analysis of the estimated individual intercepts should significantly enhance our chances of discriminating between the two hypotheses.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss our model. In section 3
we study its transitional dynamics and discuss how to discriminate among the competing hypotheses about the sources of convergence. Conclusions are in section 4.
A growth model with exogenous propensity to innovate
In this section we develop a model in which the long run growth rate of the leader economy depends on its propensity to innovate, and in which the technological catch-up of the follower depends on its own propensity to innovate. The model is extremely simple in its characterisation of the activity of innovation, but still detailed enough as far as our aim is concerned. Stationary differences in technology levels emerge as long as propensity to innovate differs across economies. Similarly to de la Fuente (1995), these differences are taken as given, and no attempt is made to explain how they come about and what policies can modify a given situation. Since our aim is to evaluate the consequences of technology heterogeneity on convergence, this limited approach suits us well enough.
Our model differs from de la Fuente's (1995) in several respects. In de la Fuente's model, accumulation of technology takes place according to
is the growth rate of technology, θ is the proportion of GDP invested in R&D, and b is a measure of the technology gap, γ and η are constants. We modify this formulation in two ways. The first concerns the relation between the growth rate and the propensity to innovate both in the leader and in the follower countries. We put this relation on what we regard to be more solid economic grounds by making the flow of innovation proportional to a measure of the amount of resources endogenously allocated to R&D in each period (see section 2.1 below). In this respect, our model is close to Shell (1966) . The second concerns the mechanism of catch-up. In the above formulation, the impact of a given gap on a country's rate of innovation is independent of the resources used to innovate (or imitate). This formulation conflicts with a large literature on catch-up, where strong emphasis is placed on how some characteristics of the follower economies determine how much of the potential catch-up is actually achieved [Abramovitz (1986) ]. We propose a different formulation, similar to the one Nelson and Phelps (1966) have used to analyse the role of the stock of human capital in the catch-up process [see also Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) , who use a similar idea in a context in which endogenous growth is allowed for]. We address this point in details in section 2.2.
In the following, we first describe growth in the leader country, and then we turn to the mechanism of catch-up.
The leader economy
We assume that good Y is produced by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology:
where K is capital, L labour and A an index of technology . Some definitions associated with this production function will be used often in the following. They are as follows:
As for how innovation is accumulated, a propensity to innovate exists defined as
where R is the total amount of the existing resources allocated to R&D
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, with 1 0 < ≤ θ .
Technological knowledge increases in proportion to R, according to the following relation:
. In the following, we assume that 1 = ε , so that endogenous growth is obtained, with the growth rate being a function of the propensity to innovate. Using (2.1) in (2.2), we have:
Technological progress is therefore a function of the per-capita amount of resources allocated to innovation in the economy 16 . Countries with similar propensities to innovate but with different levels of per-capita output have different innovation rates.
To characterise the long run rate of innovation in this economy, we now turn to the endogenous determination of the stationary value of z, the index of capital per efficiency unit. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that (δ + n)=0
17
. Then:
where s is the exogenous saving rate, 0<s<1. For consumption to be allowed in each period, the
is required. In steady-state, 15 Technology in this model is a pure public good available for free to all existing firms. As a consequence, it would be more appropriate to define our "propensity to innovate" as the fraction of resources allocated to innovation by the state, through some non-market mechanism [see Shell (1966) ]. We do not elaborate on this since we are interested in the consequences of a given heterogeneity in innovative activity, rather than in the mechanism that generate such heterogeneity. 16 An alternative would be to make the flow of innovation depend on the absolute value of R. This however would generate a counterfactual growth effect associated to the scale of the labour force. This problem (as well as the solution adopted in the text) is typical of endogenous models based on simple learning-by-doing mechanisms [see Barro e Sala-i-Martin (1995) p. 151-2].
(2.5) θ s z = and therefore:
In steady-state the leader economy grows at a constant rate endogenously determined by the parameters that describe the technology and the propensities to invest in physical capital and in innovation.
The follower economy
Few changes are necessary to characterise the follower economy. As we have suggested above, we would like to model the dependence of the intensity of technological spillovers accruing from the leader country on the resource allocated by the follower to innovate or imitate. One way of modelling this feature is simply by multiplying the propensity to innovate by a measure of the current technology gap, as in the following formulation:
where now * refers to the leader. Here the impact of a given gap on the growth rate is proportional to the follower's effort in innovation. In the absence of any effort, there are no spillovers to be gained, and no economic growth 18 . In the following we assume that 18 For a similar assumption in a different context -where technology adoption depends on the level of the stock of human capital -see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) . See also Bernard and Jones (1996) .
It is now possible to define the stationary value of the technology gap as a function of the exogenous parameters of the model.
Intertemporal equilibrium
With θ >0, the stationary value of A * /A ( Α hereafter) is:
Clearly, if all the parameters are uniform across the economies, the stationary value of the gap is one.
Differences in the propensity to innovate ( θ θ > * ) translate into the leader having a stationary technological advantage over the follower.
As for the values of z and g , we use (2.11) respectively in (2.9) and in (2.10). As regards (2.9), we find: 
Dynamic stability
The system is globally stable around its intertemporal equilibrium defined by the stationary values of z , * z and of A A * . We analyse dynamic stability by means of a two-variable ( * (2.14)
The isocline defined by (2.14) is negatively sloped and convex. Given the equations (2.3) and (2.7) above, the condition ( ) 0
(2.15)
The isocline defined by (2.15) is also negatively sloped and convex. Therefore, the dynamic stability of the intertemporal equilibrium depends on how the two functions intersect in the phase space. Let us define z φ the right hand side of (2.14), A φ the right hand side of (2.15). Figure 1 shows the case in which the intertemporal equilibrium is globally stable. Since α <1, the case depicted in the figure is indeed the relevant one for our model.
More formally, let us define
. Figure 1 shows that global stability implies
. This condition is always satisfied in our model since
A follower economy off its steady-state is generally characterised by * * < z z z z~ and
(as for instance in point B in Figure 1 ). As a consequence, its convergence path is influenced simultaneously by the capital deepening mechanism emphasised by the Solow model, and by the technological catch-up process. In the following section, we use a log-linear approximation of the system to assess the role of each component along the transitional path.
Transitional dynamics
In this section, our aim is to assess the influence exerted by the two effects on labour productivity growth in a cross-section or panel of economies. To do this, we start by log-linearizing the system around the steady-state values of z and A A * . Since our purpose is not to identify the parameters of the model exactly, but rather to show how the presence of catch-up can be detected, in the following we present a simplified version of the transitional dynamics of our model. This version is obtained by ignoring the interaction between z and the gap along the transitional path. While some precision is lost, the picture we get is sufficiently detailed for our purpose.
We start with the log-linearization of the growth rate of z around its stationary value. From equation (2.8), we have:
. Keeping A g constant for the time being, log-linearization yields: 
. Taking a loglinear approximation of ( )
around its steady-state, we have:
Using the general solution of (3.4), after a few passages (see Appendix B) we find: Equation (3.6) can be used to assess the role of heterogeneous propensity to innovate and of technological catch-up in convergence. Two different cases are discussed below. In both cases, we assume that measures for the propensity to innovate are available. However, while in the first case an index of total factor productivity does exist, in the second it does not. Detecting catch-up in the second case turns out to be a far more complex task, even when the propensity to innovate θ of individual economies can be measured accurately -as we assume it is the case from now on.
Before discussing the two cases in detail, we simplify the notation with no loss of generality by setting all individual countries' propensity to save equal to the leader's one, , with υ being defined as constant across individual economies. The presence of a catch-up process would be detected by a significantly negative coefficient of A ln and, in the case that the propensity to innovate is not uniform, by a significantly positive coefficient of θ ln . The other competing hypotheses considered above would be at odd with such an outcome. First, hypothesis (i) implies that A ln is uniform across all economies at all periods, included the initial one. Moreover, since technology is assumed to be exogenous, the propensity to innovate is not an explanatory variable of the observed differences in the growth rates of per-capita income. Second, the "stationary technological differences" hypothesis adopted by Islam (1995) implies that θ ln is again not relevant (on this more below), and that A ln is expected to be significantly positive.
Detecting technological catch-up when TFP data are not available
More complex is the interpretation of the cross-sectional or panel evidence whenever data for TFP are not available, especially as far as discriminating between hypotheses (ii) and (iii) is concerned, as we will see presently.
A preliminary problem is how to estimate (3.7) in the current case. Given the presence of unobservable technology heterogeneity, we should use a dynamic panel data model fixed-effects, since such individual intercepts would yield an indirect measure of the technology level of each economy [Islam (1995) ]. Let us rewrite (3.7) using a panel data formulation: so that the use of fixed-effect estimators in this case could be problematic. 21 We will come back to this below. For the time being let us assume that fixed-effects (LSDV) estimates of (3.9) can be obtained, with the individual intercepts yielding an approximate measure of it µ . For the sake of our discussion on how to distinguish among the various hypotheses, let us also assume that the signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are significant and in accordance with the predictions of the model.
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What conclusions should we draw from this type of evidence? First, since hypothesis (i) implies that the propensity to innovate is irrelevant for convergence analysis, it predicts that its coefficient is zero. So we can rule out hypothesis (i) in favour of the other hypotheses. Second, since (3.9) is obtained under hypothesis (iii), the above quoted result would clearly support this hypothesis. However, it also yields support for hypothesis (ii), so that at this stage the latter cannot be ruled out in favour of hypothesis (iii).
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To see how this problem arises, the main step is to impose that technology diffusion is exhausted in our model [hypothesis (ii)], so that convergence is due entirely to capital-deepening (see point C in Figure 1 ). Under this assumption, 20 Under hypothesis (iii) the initial degree of technology heterogeneity cannot be regarded as strictly time-invariant. The reason is that technology diffusion is present, technology growth rates differ along the transitional path leading to their common steady-state value. Consequently, it µ includes the term ( )
and cannot be properly defined as an individual intercept. 21 The problem we discuss here is different from the one raised by Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1998) in their comment on Islam (1995) about the use of panel data for convergence analysis. The approach they propose is based on the idea that technology growth rates tend to differ in the long-as well as in the short-run. 22 We obtain an outcome of this type using data on 109 European regions, 1980-93. See Paci and Pigliaru (1999) . 23 To the best of our knowledge, up to now this problem has not yet been discussed in the empirical literature on convergence.
where All we could say at this stage is that technology heterogeneity, due to differences in propensity to innovate, is relevant for convergence analysis.
To test whether technology diffusion is active or exhausted, we have to search for other distinct testable implications of the model under the two alternative hypotheses. To this aim, consider again the term it µ associated with hypothesis (iii). We have already noticed that it µ cannot be regarded as a proper fixed-effect, so that we cannot obtain reliable indirect measures of it by means of the individual intercepts in LSDV estimates over a long period of time. However, suppose that splitting the whole period under observation in several sub-periods made it µ a semi-permanent term in (3.9). This is a crucial assumption for our purposes, because in this case we could obtain LSDV estimates of (3.9) for properly defined sub-periods, and then use the estimated individual intercepts to test the following implications of the model. On the other hand, under hypothesis (ii) 2 ρ σ is time-invariant, since -abstracting again from random disturbances -it is assumed to be at its steady-state value 2 ρ σ . Second, the correlation between the individual intercepts and the growth rates of y is positive under hypothesis (ii) [Islam (1995) ], and negative under hypothesis (iii). Finally, under hypothesis (iii) the correlation between the fixed-effects 24 Recall that we are assuming that the propensity to save is uniform across all economies. 25 More generally, finding that a technological variable such as R&D or patents exert a statistically significant positive effect on growth does not offer indisputable evidence that catch-up is part of the observed convergence. See Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniels (1997) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) , among many others, for a different viewpoint on the interpretation of evidence of this type. 26 However, in the absence of "absolute convergence" in technology levels the case
is not ruled out (similarly, β-convergence does not necessarily imply σ-convergence unless steady-state values are uniform across individuals).
and the propensity to innovate should increase over time, as the system approaches its balanced groth path.
Estimating (3.9) [and (3.10) ] by means of LSDV regressions over different sub-periods should therefore significantly enhance our chances of discriminating between the two hypotheses. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple growth model where technology accumulation in lagging economies depends on their propensity to innovate and on inter-regional spillovers, and convergence is due to both capital-deepening and catch up. We have used the model to show how to generate unambiguous evidence on the role of technology diffusion in the observed convergence.
The transitional dynamics of our model shows that, in the absence of data on TFP, the most compelling task is to discriminate between the catch-up case and the alternative case based on the existence of stationary technology differences. Future research should address this important empirical problem along the lines suggested in section 3, where we have showed that the pattern of the fixedeffects in panel data regressions can be usefully analysed in order to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
As for the model of growth used in this paper, one interesting development would be to explore the possibility that the stock of human capital take part in the determination of the stationary technology gap -as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) -, together with the propensity to innovate analysed in this paper. Finally, the possibility that there exist a spatial component in the distribution of the propensity to innovate across individual economies should also be considered within the framework adopted here. Now we use the stationary value taken by z for 0 = + δ n in (A.2). By doing so, we obtain the value of the change of z associated with the increase of δ + n from zero to ( ) Rearranging terms in this latter equation we get (3.5).
